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ABSTRACT

The NGO-donor relationship is exceptionally volatile. NGOs, particularly in developing
countries, rely heavily on donor funding. Resource dependence has directed NGOs to
adjust their objectives to fit with donor priorities. Fluctuating preferences of donors lead
NGOs to shift their behavior and respond to the objectives of the donor rather than the
beneficiaries of the local community. Many NGOs in developing countries modify their
activities and target groups to attain or sustain financial resources. One major
consequence of this is that NGOs’ behavioral shift may have disconnected them from
their constituents. Hence, aid allocated to recipient NGOs in developing countries may
not be efficient in generating development in local communities. It is important to note
that this research is not an evaluation of whether NGOs are ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The study is
about the relationship between NGOs and donor agencies.
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INTRODUCTION

10

INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
As development actors, NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) have become
the major service provider in states where the government is unable to fulfill its
role in specific areas. NGOs are increasingly becoming a significant force. They
are claimed to be effective, independent, flexible, and responsive to the least
privileged in society. The past two decades in particular have marked a wave of a
huge growth in the number of NGOs. Consequently, the role of NGOs in almost
every society has been rising which led them to form a strong distinctive sector,
which is composed of civil society organizations. NGOs have developed into
crucial actors engaged in key aspects of social life; such as health, education,
environmental issues, gender issues, development, and human rights. (Bagci,
2003).

NGOs operate by raising finances from governments, private sources, or donor
agencies. According to statistics, international donor agencies form the
fundamental financial contributor to NGOs. (Bagci, 2003). The amount of funds
and the decision of who gets funded are in the hands of the donor agency. NGOs,
particularly in developing countries, heavily rely on foreign donors for funds.
Donor dominance is clearly evident. (AbouAssi, 2012). Thus, NGOs find
themselves trying to fit their organizational procedures and operations to donors’
priorities. The question that poses itself is to what extent do donors influence the
decision making of NGOS?
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Throughout the past decade, most NGOs as well as donor agencies have
perceived the important link between human rights and development. It has even
been noticed that both concepts go hand in hand. Human rights and development
have become tightly linked. Their shared objective being the improvement of
human well-being is based on a belief in the inherent dignity and equality of all
people. (HRBA Portal). The gravest human rights concerns that have been
ongoing for years are poverty and inequality. (UNDP, Human Development
Report). In fact, development cannot be isolated from those concerns.

With the world witnessing so many human rights violations, the importance of
NGOs became even more significant. However, NGOs still find themselves
unable to be efficient and effective forces in the fight against human rights abuse.
A major reason why NGOs cannot fulfill this task is due to funding problems.
Because of the difficulty of being chosen by the donor agency, NGOs started
adjusting their projects in ways that fit with the priorities of the donors.
Consequently, NGOs started drifting from a focus on community needs to
becoming a service delivery agent.

Donor dominance is especially evident in NGOs in developing countries. The aim
of this study is to examine the NGO-donor relationship in developing countries
and apply it to the particular context of Egyptian civil society, as Egypt is
considered one of the developing countries that features both a growing number
of NGOs as well as a rising number of human rights violations. This examination
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draws on qualitative research that will be achieved through evaluating the
behavior of NGOs, which were originally established as a tool for fighting and
reducing, if not eliminating, human rights violations.

1.2. The Research Problem
Most of the non-governmental organizations in Egypt (NGOs) have emerged in
response to the increasing human rights violations in the country. Despite
different ideologies and priorities, an immense number of NGOs supposedly have
the common goal of eradicating gross human rights abuses. However, even
though the number of NGOs fighting human rights abuse has significantly
increased, the reported incidents of human rights abuse have risen drastically.

The purpose of this research is to understand why NGOs adopt perspectives and
priorities derived from funding sources. Understanding NGOs’ organizational
practice and performance is crucial to any explanation of their inability to
completely fulfill their declared purpose. Hence, this study entails an examination
of the structure and functioning of the organizations.

The influence of donors on NGOs is an explanatory factor in understanding why
NGOs function as they do and why they select their project issues in a specific
order. While donors set their funding priorities, NGOs find themselves in a
situation where they have to adapt. The remarkable growth of NGOs over the last
decade would not have been possible without the financial contributions of
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donors. In the case of Egypt, the major source of development financial aid
delivery to NGOs comes from international donors. This reality tends to drive
NGOs to formulate their policies and projects in ways that fit donors’ priorities.

International donors come from different cultures and face different problems
than the ones faced by communities in developing countries. Therefore, some
problems that could be significant to developing countries are not on the list of
donors’ priorities because the donor simply has other objectives. With the
government doing very little help to strengthen and support NGOs, those
organizations are obliged to shift their behavior and objectives to fit donor
priorities in order to continue surviving.

1.3. The Research Question and Hypothesis
1.3.1. Research Question
What is the significance of donor conditionality in impacting the behavior
of a resource-dependent NGO?

1.3.2. Sub-Questions


To what extent does resource dependence theory help explain today’s
relationships between NGOs and donors?



Why are international donors the major contributors of NGO funding
rather than state agencies?
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What impact does donors’ decision to change their funding priorities have
on NGO’s established priorities?

1.3.3. Hypothesis
Despite Egyptian NGO’s sincere attempt to serve beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance
on foreign resources has resulted in their shifting established priorities to align
with donor interests.

1.4. The Research Objective
The objective of this research is to address the central research question. There are
three major goals in addressing this question. The first goal is to apprehend the
shift in NGOs projects based on a change in donor’s priority areas through a
comprehensive conceptual framework. The second goal is to provide a better
understanding to NGOs behavior and decisions. Finally, the third goal is to
identify and analyze the most obvious developmental problems that occur in
society due to NGOs responding to the donors rather than to the people in the
community.

1.5. Methodology
This study is a partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of
Arts. A qualitative research methodology is used for this study. Michael Patton
defined qualitative research as attempting to understand the unique interactions in
a specific situation. (Patton, 1996). The purpose of understanding is not
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necessarily to predict what may occur, but rather to comprehend the situation.
Therefore, this study attempts to identify and explain essential elements of the
relationship between foreign donors in Egypt, and by extension, NGOs in
developing countries. The test of the hypothesis is attributed to a combination of
factors. The two main factors that constitute a test to the hypothesis are: the
impact of donors on NGOs shifting priorities and the extent of the significance of
the shift in priorities.

Throughout this study, I used a combination of various research techniques for
data collection and analysis in order to examine the aforementioned factors. The
following outlines these techniques.

1.5.1. Observation
My study is initially based on a time I spent in a human rights organization in
Cairo. Throughout my training there, I observed how actual decisions were being
taken and how priorities were being formulated. I attended formal as well as
informal meetings, which allowed me to form a concrete idea about the
importance of funding in the creation of future projects. It is important to note that
my reliance on this particular case study aims at touching on a reality extending
far beyond the Egyptian context. What I have witnessed during my internship led
me to start my research study on NGOs in developing countries.
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This NGO, in particular, did not undergo a paradigm shift, which affects the test
of my hypothesis. However, the changes that the NGO has implemented in
priority areas according to donor preferences- even though under the same title of
human rights- prove to be evidently significant. Furthermore, this NGO was
initially based on personal funding. The moment the NGO turned to foreign
donors is the moment where everything changed. Instead of committing to their
initial projects and beneficiaries, this case illustrates how the need of resource
eventually leads most NGOs to not only to turn to donors, but more importantly to
prioritize donor interests. The knowledge I gained throughout this process gave
me solid evidence that will help me answer my research question.

1.5.2. Documentary Analysis
I have done an extensive research through books, articles, and United Nations
publications on the concept and practice of NGO-donor relationship. In this
research, I focused on a document analysis procedure in the context of the study.
The nature and form of publications involved in this research outlines the
advantages and limitations of document analysis. The research documents are rich
in terms of theories, approaches, and understanding behaviors. However, it is
scarce in documents about NGO practice because NGOs are not explicit about
their shifting behaviors. The application of document analysis to a grounded
theory study is illustrated.

17

The aforementioned primary and secondary sources allowed me to collect the
information I need to reach a reasonable conclusion to my research. Gathering
information, participation and observation are all fundamental and highly
important methods in all qualitative inquiry.

Despite problems and limitation with data resources, I was able to collect
different kinds of data resources such as books, articles, and other documents
from different resources along the previous period. These data are reasonable in
light of the evidence and the aims of the study. Analyzing these documents and
materials in a scientific way, makes it more reliable and credible. Finally,
accuracy in a study comes from the validity of the research, the reliability of the
findings, and the use of triangulation in data collection. Therefore, to address the
accuracy of the analysis, transparency in presenting the data is always ensured.

1.6. Structure of the thesis
The Structure of the thesis is as follows; the first chapter serves as an introduction
to the topic of this study, specifically clarifying the research problem, as well as
the proposed hypothesis, the research objectives, the methodology underlying this
research and the structure of the upcoming thesis chapters. The second chapter
provides a review of the relevant scholarly literature and illustrates the conceptual
framework of this study. It explains the Resource Dependence Theory, and its
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importance for understanding NGO behavior. The chapter illuminates two
important concepts that will further illustrate the relationship between NGOs and
donors. Those two concepts are: the Dependency Trap and Power Relations. This
chapter, furthermore, attempts to explain NGO behavior through Hirschman’s
theory of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. The third chapter introduces the nature of the
NGO-Donor relationship. The first part in this chapter discusses the NGOs’
funding options and illustrates why most NGOs ultimately resort to international
donors. The second part of this chapter explains NGOs’ reactions to donors’
decision to change their funding priorities. The particular focus of this chapter is
to demonstrate how the shift from community-based assessment to donor
priorities can impede the development of a society rather than enhance it. Chapter
four is a contextualization of the NGO scene in Egypt. It focuses on the years post
the 25 January revolution. This overall mapping illustrates the nature of Egyptian
NGOs, the significance of foreign funding, and the areas of interests and
specialization. The fifth chapter evaluates the work of NGOs in Egypt. The Arab
House Foundation for Human rights is used as a case study to evaluate the shift in
projects in the recent years. This chapter illustrates findings and explains how the
shift in NGO projects has been a response to the donor rather than to the Egyptian
community. The sixth chapter is the concluding chapter. It highlights all the
major points tackled in this research. Furthermore, it provides recommendations
for overcoming the volatile relationship between NGOs and donors. Finally, the
limitations of this research will be addressed.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Literature Review

2.1.1. The nature of NGOs-donor relationship

One of the particularities of development is the reliance on international donors
for policies and funding. Development administrators in developing countries,
including NGOs, face a critical dilemma. They must maintain a consistent stance
on values that emphasize self- determination, empowerment, and an equitable
distribution of benefits, while also acting to fulfill the political agendas of donors
who act according to their own national interests. (Hook, 1995; Brinkerhoff and
Coston, 1999; Martens, 2008). This dilemma dominates the NGO- donor
relationships.

It is hard to make generalizations about the nature of the relationship between
donors and their recipient local partner organizations. NGOs play many roles in
the relationship, such as implementers of donors’ policies and programs, catalysts
of change in their respective communities, and partners in the development
process and aid industry. (AbouAssi, 2012). Although the degree of agency and
autonomy varies among these categories, donors usually dominate the
relationship.

The supply-led approach is the most dominant in the donor-NGOs relationship
rather than the demand-led one. Donors have interests to accommodate besides
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those of their beneficiaries (Martens, 2008). In the realist perspective on foreign
assistance, precedence is given to the donor’s national interests. Development
assistance and aid policies are seen as tools for implementing the foreign policies
of donor countries. In their study on who gives to whom and for what, Alesina
and Dollar (2000: 55) confirm that aid allocations are “very effective at promoting
strategic interests of donors”.

On the receiver end, NGOs are compelled to dramatically transform their
operation and organizational cultures to the extent that they lose much of their
local identity, as well as their affinity with constituents. In developing countries,
“donors develop their programs, preferences and priorities and revise them at an
ever-increasing pace, while (at best) NGOs try to figure out how they might fit in
or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest preoccupation of donors”.
(Doornbos, 2003: 15).

There is a high conditionality of grants in terms of targeted (and excluded)
beneficiaries and locales and types of services to be delivered or brands of
products purchased (Basombrío, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999; Chambers
and Pettit, 2004). Thus, the most critical consequence is that as the NGO adjusts
and conforms to the agendas, expectations, and interests of donors, it loses touch
with both its mission and constituency. Froelich (1999) defines this practice as
goal displacement, which “occurs when goals and activities are modified to
satisfy the wishes of contributors” (250).
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When an NGO shifts its programs to appeal to and appease the donor’s appetite,
its role and practices are “determined by donor fashion and demands according to
ideas and designs imposed and imported from outside”. (Edwards, Hulme and
Wallace, 1999: 130). Despite an NGO’s candid emphasis on or attempt to serve
beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance on foreign resources shifts their sights and priorities
to align with donor interests. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004).

2.1.2. Donor priorities vs. community needs allocation

Several studies argue that the targeting of official donors to needy recipient
countries with reasonably good local conditions (in terms of basic institutions and
economic policies) is far from perfect. The needs-based allocation of NGOs may
be distorted by selfish donor motives. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that
bilateral partnership was dictated as much by political and strategic motives of
donors as by need and local conditions in recipient countries. More recently,
Berthélemy (2006) still labels various donors “egoistic”, rather than selfless.

In several respects, NGOs may provide better-targeted aid than official donors.
Most obviously perhaps is that the allocation of NGO aid should be less distorted
by commercial and political interests of donor governments. The poverty focus of
NGO aid may also be stronger than that of donors’; NGOs may be better in
reaching the poor by avoiding governments in the recipient country and dealing
directly with local target groups (Riddell et al., 1995). Moreover, after the World
Bank posited in the late 1990s that government-to-government transfers do not
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work when governance is particularly bad in the recipient country, it was
sometimes argued that NGOs have comparative advantage of working in difficult
environments (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).

Arguably, it depends on the degree of financial autonomy whether or not aid
allocation by NGOs differs from that of state agencies. While NGOs suggest
autonomy from government organizations, NGOs are often intimately connected
with their home governments. However, the dependence of many NGOs on
funding is expected to shape their aid allocation. To the extent that they follow
their official donors, their aid allocation would no longer be superior in terms of
targeting the needy and deserving. More specifically, with future funding from
official donors at risk, financially dependent NGOs can be expected to allocate
aid strategically, e.g., by targeting less poor communities where success is easier
to achieve (Koch et al., 2007). In other words, NGOs may be tempted to improve
the chances of continued official refinancing by demonstrating visible results that
tend to be easier to achieve with projects addressing less entrenched forms of
poverty. Hence, NGOs start working on development goals that may not be
crucial to the citizens of the country.

The first section of this chapter discussed the literature review. The following
section of the chapter presents the conceptual framework that is going to be
employed in the qualitative study.
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2.2. Resource Dependency Theory

Organizational theories consider organizations to be open systems. (Scott, 1987).
William R. Scott defined an organization as a “coalition of shifting interest groups
that develop goals by negotiation [...] influenced by environmental factors”.
(Scott, 1987: 23). Thus, organizational decisions and behaviors are rooted in the
surrounding environment. (AbouAssi, 2012). Scholars who worked on the
Resource Dependence Theory emphasize that “to understand the behavior of an
organization, you must understand the context of the behavior”. (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978: 1). Hence, understanding organizational practice requires
concentrating on organizations’ interactions with the external environment.
(Thompson, 1967).
Resource Dependence Theory argues that organizations are resource-insufficient.
Their major challenge is to obtain and sustain resources from their external
environment. (AbouAssi, 2012). Since actors from the external environment
control resources, they perceive certain advantage in their relationship with the
organization. They exercise power through their control over resources by
exerting demands on organizations. The heavier the dependence of the
organization on external actors for resources, the more powerful the actors are and
the more influential their demands on organizations become in exchange for
resources. (AbouAssi, 2012).
For the organization, the major challenge is to find a way where it can effectively
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respond to external demands while simultaneously not compromising its existing
objectives. However, in reality, this challenge rapidly becomes paramount, and
not merely “major”. (Oliver, 1991). Organizations, then, become coalitions
protecting external demands by “altering purposes and domains to accommodate
new interests, sloughing off parts of themselves to avoid some interests, and when
necessary, becoming involved in activities far afield from their stated central
purposes”. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 24).
Scholars studying organizational behavior developed three dimensions that
determine the degree of dependence of organizations on external resources. The
three dimensions (as exhibited in figure 1) are: criticality, concentration, and
discretion. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006: 495).

Criticality

Concentration

Discretion

Figure 1: Resource Dependence Theory
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The first dimension is criticality or, in other words, the importance of resources.
This dimension measures the criticality of the input or output of the organization.
(Cho and Gillespie, 2006). The level of dependency in this dimension is expressed
by how much the organization needs external resources for not only its
operations, but also, and more importantly, for its survival.
The second dimension is the concentration of resources. The availability of other
sources in the external environment for the same resources is crucial in measuring
the dependency of the organization. The organization’s autonomy increases and
dependence upon external actors decreases when there is availability of
alternative resources. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006).
The third dimension is external actors’ discretion over resource allocation and
use. Who gets what is completely in the hands of external actors. All questions
about the possession of resources, access to resources, actual use of resources, and
ability to regulate the employment of resources is a choice made by the external
actor. (Cho and Gillespie, 2006).

2.3. The Resource Dependence Perspective
The importance of the Resource Dependency Theory was not formalized until the
1970s. When Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik published “The External
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective” (1978). This
27

book was necessary as it enabled scholars to understand the behavior of
organizations through understanding the environments in which they are
embedded. The Resource Dependence Perspective holds that in order to survive,
organizations need to acquire and maintain resources through interacting with
external actors. These interactions shape their activities and eventually lead to
different outcomes. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In environments where
resources are abundant, the interdependence between organizations and external
actors are minimal. However, in environments where resources are scarce,
organizations’ survival are challenged due to their strong dependence on external
actors for resources.

According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), organizations are dependent on
external actors for the exchange of financial and physical resources, information,
or social legitimacy. In return, external actors have demands that can conflict with
the organizations’ goals. In order to satisfy these demands, organizations find
themselves in a vulnerable situation, which may be at the expense of their initial
goals. Organizations, hence, become dependent on external actors in order to
operate.

According to this perspective, organizations measure the level of dependence and
consider it during decision-making. Furthermore, individuals within organizations
are considered rational actors who weigh the cost and benefits of choices to
maximize their own benefits, which accordingly shape their behavior. (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978: 52).
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2.4. NGOs and Resources
Judith R. Saidel (2000) defines the resources that nonprofits need as “anything of
value, tangible or intangible that can be exchanged between organizations”.
(Saidel, 2000: 381). As an illustration, Saidel identifies the exchange of resources
in the relationship between government and Non-Governmental organizations
(NGOs) in terms of those provided by government, such as revenues, information,
and access to policy processes, and those controlled by NGOs, such as servicedelivery capacity, political support, and legitimacy (Saidel, 2000: 381).
Alnoor Ebrahim (2005b) distinguishes among resources exchanged in the donorrecipient relationship. He suggests that this ‘capital exchange’ can be of two
forms: economic material resources such as money, property, and infrastructure,
and symbolic non-material resources including authority, technical advice and
expertise, reputation, information, and connections (Ebrahim, 2005a: 52).
Exchange of resources between organizations is characterized by
interdependence; one organization’s output is another organization’s input. An
organization cannot produce its output unless and/or until another organization
generates its own. Thus, interdependence transpires by behavior. In such a
situation, the activities of one organization depend on those of another. That is
“why nothing comes out the way one wants it to”. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:
40). Interdependence moderates the steepness of dependence that characterizes an
NGO’s relationship with a single funder. (Saidel, 2000). Accordingly,
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organizations try to manage their resource dependence through the creation of
interdependencies “which involve the exchange of resources rather than a flow
that is predominantly in one direction”. (Ebrahim, 2005b: 60). Nevertheless,
although the motive is to reduce uncertainty, interdependence may create
additional uncertainty and unpredictability, restructure relations but sustain power
imbalances, and increase control issues between organizations.
An NGO, normally, balances its internal revenues with external funding,
diversifies external sources, and avoids concentrating the flow of funding from a
specific source. To illustrate, an NGO with diversified external funding source is
in a better position to respond to and balance external demands, especially when
the demands are different. (AbouAssi, 2012). If one source alters conditions for
funding, an NGO can fend off the pressure to comply by relying on other sources
that are more resilient, including its internal revenues. An NGO can also
sequentially attend to the demands of various funders, which allows the
organization to positively respond to what suits its interests and defer other
demands until further developments occur. An NGO can explicitly play one donor
off against another or benefit from available information to strengthen its position
and influence or moderate donor demands. On the other hand, as NGO
dependence on resources increases, the ability of donors to constrain the
organization’s behavior increases, while the ability of the organization to buffer
external demands decreases. In such a case, an NGO does not enjoy many options
to respond to changes in funding conditions. The NGO complies with donor
interests, whether immediately when the donor monopolizes the resource
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environment of the NGO or eventually when the NGO realizes its limited ability
to find an alternative route. In such a case, adjustment becomes a haven from
excessive control and a strategy to buffer and moderately appeal to donors’
demands and ensure the continuity of funding. (AbouAssi, 2012).
Resource Dependence Theory indicates that the organization can comply, adapt,
manage, or attempt to manipulate and alter its resource environment. It needs to
assess the anticipated repercussions of non-compliance with external demands,
the cost of abandoning the available resources and securing others, and the degree
of conflict between the various demands of actors on whom the organization is
dependent. (Oliver, 1990).

2.5. Power relations

Organizational theory accounts for the changes that are occurring in NGOs in
developing countries due to their unbalanced power relationships with funding
organizations. According to neoinstitutional theorists DiMaggio and Powell
(1983), coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms lead to isomorphism,
which means greater similarities between organizations. Coercive isomorphism is
a result of formal and informal pressure between organizations as well as cultural
societal expectations. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that the more
dependent an organization is on its exchange partners, the more this leads to
greater similarities between organizations. Therefore, according to this
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perspective, one could expect that formal and informal pressures would easily
influence dependent organizations; causing them gradually to become more
similar to influential organizations as they adopt legitimating forms and practices.
(Rauh, 2010).

Wallace, Bornstein and Chapman (2006) argue that the relationship between
NGOs in developing countries and international donors is explained through the
concepts of coercion and compliance. Donor agencies control funding and
therefore are in a position of power. These donors set the agenda and conditions
required for receiving a grant. (Markowitz and Tice, 2002; Henderson, 2002).
According to Wallace et al. (2006), this coercion goes hand in hand with the
dependent organization’s consent to the conditions on funding. Because donors
have control over the funding and can decide to withdraw their contribution,
coercion may include force (Wallace et al., 2006). However, it is often a result of
the acceptance of norms that are rarely questioned or challenged because they are
seen as the standardized or “correct” way to do development work (Wallace et al.,
2006). In other words, coercion may be direct or indirect through the adoption of
norms held within the NGO.

Donors are in a position of power since they control resources on which NGOs’
depend. Consequently, donors specify conditions on how aid is used and how
programs are implemented. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004). The problem that arises
is that foreign funding often creates program objectives in a very different context
than where they will be implemented. Therefore, those objectives often do not fit
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the cultures that receive them. (Lindenberg, 2001). Donor priorities fluctuate
towards development areas that are currently popular. (Degnbol-Martinussen and
Engberg-Pedersen, 2003). These frequent fluctuations in donor priorities increase
environmental uncertainty and the pressure to implement programs that are likely
to be seen as “successful” rather than addressing the root of the problem, which
usually involves complex, long-term processes. Funders often favor programs
with easily quantifiable results, but these often are not able to promote longerterm, sustainable projects (Lindenberg, 2001). Similarly, donor agendas may limit
particular political strategies, even when they lead to greater long-term and
meaningful social change. (Markowitz and Tice, 2002).

Furthermore, the financial instability in many recipient countries makes salaried
employment at an NGO a much greater opportunity than what would otherwise be
available, and therefore, securing grants at any cost can become a powerful focus
of some organizations (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). These aspects of power and
dependency have resulted in some NGOs shifting their focus from important areas
for their beneficiaries, towards areas of donor interest that will attract a large
amount of funding (Edwards and Hulme, 1998).

Organizations further down the aid chain from their funding sources will be
subject to formal pressure to adopt donor-driven goals, policies, and standardized
procedures. (Lister, 2000). Informal pressures to adopt the values, norms, and
legitimating practices have a powerful effect on dependent organizations. (Brehm,
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2001). Together, these direct and indirect pressures have resulted in NGOs in
developing countries adopting Northern agendas and practices.

2.6. The dependency trap

Scholars argue that the relationship between NGOs and donors often becomes
trapped in a dependency cycle. Kendall W. Stiles (2002) identifies three stages in
the NGO-Donor relationship, based on his research of NGOs in Bangladesh,
which he refers to as the “intermestic development circles”. (Stiles, 2002). He
maintains that social structures gradually emerge from an initiation stage to
institutionalization stage and finally to the maturation stage. The initiation stage is
characterized by bargaining and negotiating, where each side expresses its
interests and objectives. Donors always want to do more with less, while NGOs
aim for more with more. (Stiles, 2002). After this phase, the relationship between
NGOs and donors reaches the institutionalization stage. This stage is
characterized by basic contract agreements; the donor approves funding and the
NGO begins to work on a project that is monitored and evaluated by the donor.
When the relationship becomes prolonged and is based on ongoing interaction
and coordination, it enters the next stage, which is the maturation stage. This stage
of maturation is distinguished by a coherent social structure that separates itself
from the rest of society. All members of the donor-NGO circle undergo certain
changes to fit within the emerging structure; however, the degree of change is
relative. Donors must reposition themselves to accommodate the demands of
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other members; however, the change they undergo is subtle compared to that
initiated by domestic organizations. (AbouAssi, 2012). Stiles (2002) calls this
change the ‘universalization of like-mindedness’, where the policies and
objectives of donors and NGOs start to converge or reflect each other. (Stiles,
2012).

On the receiver end, NGOs are compelled to dramatically transform their
operation and organizational cultures to the extent that they lose much of their
local identity, as well as their touch with constituents. Hence, the further down the
maturation stage, the less is the ability of these NGOs to work on their own and
the more dependent they become on external funding. (AbouAssi, 2012).

2.7. Uncertainty in the Relationship
Within this dependency lies uncertainty. The NGO-donor relationship is
especially volatile because of the inconsistency in donors’ funding and the
consequent confusion and instability among partner organizations. Landell-Mills
(1992) emphasized that “external funding should always take the form of
supplementary assistance and ought never be the main source of what is needed”.
(Landell-Mills, 1992: 554). Otherwise, the sustainability of the organization
becomes highly questionable. (AbouAssi, 2012).
In developing countries, “donors develop their programs, preferences and
priorities and revise them at an ever-increasing pace, while NGOs try to figure out
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how they might fit in or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest
preoccupation of donors”. (Doornbos, 2003: 15). Frequent fluctuation in funding
priorities entrenches uncertainty in the surrounding environment of the NGOs and
leads to additional pressure on and confusion among these organizations.
(Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003).
The consequences of such uncertainty and confusion take different forms. One
consequence is the drive towards changes in the governance, management, and
culture of recipient organizations. NGOs start modifying their organizational
culture to fit with the changing surrounding environment.
Another consequence of the discrepancy between donors’ interests and NGOs’
objectives is the rising concept of ‘designation’. (Barman, 2008). This concept
basically means that the funder specifies where the contribution is to be spent and
which beneficiaries are to be targeted, instead of allocating an unrestricted grant.
(Barman, 2008). Such a practice is at the heart of international development
assistance, evidenced through the conditionality of grants in terms of targeted
(and excluded) beneficiaries and locales and types of services to be delivered or
brands of products purchased (Basombrio, 2000).
The most critical consequence is that as the NGO adjusts and conforms to the
agendas, expectations, and interests of donors, it loses touch with its mission and
constituency. This practice is defined as goal displacement, which “occurs when
goals and activities are modified to satisfy the wishes of contributors” (Froelich,
1999: 250).
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When an NGO shifts its programs to appeal to and appease the donor’s appetite,
its role and practices are “determined ... by donor fashion and demands according
to ideas and designs imposed and imported from outside” (Edwards, Hulme and
Wallace, 1999: 130). Despite an NGO’s candid emphasis on or attempt to serve
beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance on foreign resources shifts their sights and priorities
to align with donor interests. (Chambers and Pettit, 2004). In the expressively
titled article, ‘AIDS is Money’, Simon Morfit (2011) asserts that to maintain
credibility and viability among international donors, Sub-Saharan African NGOs
had to ‘do AIDS’ because this was the priority of international funders. While the
status of these NGOs rose vis-à-vis other organizations working on other sectors,
attention was also diverted away from other critical problems faced by African
communities (Morfit, 2011). Thus, when the NGO sector becomes heavily
dependent on donor agencies, such as in Kenya where 90% of NGOs’ funds come
from foreign aid (Hearn, 1998), NGOs find themselves in a dependency trap;
“they needed the financial resources provided by donors in order to survive”
(Bieber, 2002: 27).
Due to increased dependency and inconsistent donor funding, NGOs have to
struggle with balancing normative development imperatives and institutional
imperatives. The normative imperative is considered a bottom line approach that
compensates for the failures of other sectors, empowers marginalized groups,
encourages voice, focuses on stakeholders, highlights flexibility and risk taking,
and invests in impact-oriented programs towards long term goals that ensure
sustainability. (Smith and Gronbjerg, 2006). However, institutional imperatives
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lead to a hierarchical relationship, with bureaucratization and duplication of
initiatives, falloff in flexibility and innovation, a compromised ability to articulate
ideas and values, a critical suspicion by and isolation from local interests, loss of
small-scale comparative advantage, and conflicting accountability mechanisms
(Sanayal, 1997).
The abundance and inconsistency of funding constitute a twofold risk. Abundance
of funding might attract “unscrupulous organizations possessing agendas which
are antithetical” to donors’ priorities or to the community’s needs and interests
(Robinson, 1995: 76). Inconsistency in funding exhausts NGOs and forces them
to pay attention to donors rather than to their constituencies.

2.8. Explaining NGO behavior
In his book “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”, Albert O. Hirschman (1970) explains his
theory of exit, voice and loyalty options in terms of consumers who feel that the
products of a particular company are deteriorating (see figure 2). Even though his
theory is stated in terms of businesses and the market, it has a further application
on partner organizations. Hirschman’s theory argues that customers who are
dissatisfied with a particular product or service, have the choice to either
complain to the firm and call for change (voice) or simply leave the firm and find
an alternative one (exit) (Hirschman, 1970). According to Hirschman, the key
determinant of the choice between exit and voice is the flexibility of the demand
for a particular product or service. In other words, the necessity of this product or
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service to the consumer and the ability to find an alternative dictate consumer’s
reaction and behavior.
‘Exit’ is a feasible solution for consumers as long as there are other options
available to them. In competitive markets, consumers can easily switch from one
firm to another. Hence, if a consumer is not pleased at one firm, ‘exit’ is the
viable solution to the customer. However, if the market is monopolized and the
product is a necessity, ‘exit’ is no longer possible solution to the consumer.
(Hirschman, 1970). No matter how low the quality is, customers can no longer
leave since this is the only option to get what they need. However, they can still
utter discontent to the management by using the ‘voice’ solution. This solution
requires the customer to put up with the degradation of the product for a period of
time and the uncertainty of whether the firm could come back on track or not.

Exit

Loyalty

Voice

Behavior directed
towards leaving
the organization

Active and
constructive
attempts to
improve conditions

Passively waiting
for conditions to
improve

Figure 2: Hirschman's model of explaining behavior
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Hirschman then discusses the interactions between both ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. He
illustrates that when both options are available to the consumer, the consumer will
end up more probably choosing ‘exit’ over ‘voice’. (Hirschman, 1970). The
consumer will simply look for a better alternative and leave. On the other hand,
customers will only resort to ‘voice’ when they have faith that the management
will respond effectively to their complaints. (Hirschman, 1970).
To Hirschman, with the concepts of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ comes the concept of
‘loyalty’ or ‘adjustment’. He introduces loyalty and defines it as a feeling of
attachment to an organization of which one is a member. (Hirschman, 1970).
With the presence of loyalty, the cost of ‘exit’ is higher. Hence, loyalty alters
behavior and pressures the consumer to invoke their ‘voice’ option instead.
Loyalty can delay the ‘exit’ option but not exclude it entirely. Hirschman (1970)
stresses that loyalty is a rational calculated behavior. Thus, if loyalists find no
change after exhausting the ‘voice’ option and are convinced that the firm is
doomed to fail, they would ‘exit’ for sure.
In application to the NGO-donor relationship, the demand for funding, as a
product or service, is supposedly elastic due to the fluctuation in NGO reliance on
external resources and the growth in operations. Thus, the assumption is that
‘exit’ could be a common option because demand is changing. However, in the
practical world, NGOs have different modes of reactions based on several factors.
One important factor is the availability and access to information. The more the
NGO has access to information about the donor’s interests and plans; it is more
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likely to practice the ‘voice’ option. (Gehlbach, 2006). The cost of the ‘exit’
option here is very high because the NGO has already made investments in its
organizational capacity to comply with donor requirements.
Another crucial factor is the time interval of the relationship. When there is a long
relationship between the NGO and the donor, the probability of using the ‘voice’
option is far greater than the ‘exit’ one. (AbouAssi, 2012). With a longer
relationship, the NGO is able to understand what is going on and what is coming
next. There are systems already in place that allow the NGO to respond to donor
requirements of reporting, accounting, monitoring, and evaluation. (AbouAssi,
2012). NGOs invested in these systems because they wanted to relax and stabilize
their relationship with the donors. Therefore, dissatisfaction with a donor decision
is not, in itself, critical enough for the NGO to ‘exit’. They resort to bargaining
instead because it is worth the NGO’s invested time, efforts, and resources.
(AbouAssi, 2012).
The most important factor, however, is the availability of other donors. While the
previous two factors take the concept of ‘loyalty’ into great consideration when
taking decisions, this factor does not. Whenever an opportunity poses itself in
front of the NGO for a better donor, the NGO will immediately use the ‘exit’
option. As mentioned previously, ‘loyalty’ is a calculated behavior. (Hirschman,
1970). The cost of ‘exit’ here is low because the donor cannot impose any penalty
on the NGO for its behavior or decision to leave.
These factors help explain the behavior of NGOs most of the time. However,

41

organizations are best understood through analyzing their behavior economically
rather than their internal social or political dynamics. Any serious endeavor to
explore how ‘exit, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ show up in actual everyday behavior
among nonprofits needs to confront the ways that labeling organizations as
‘nonprofit’ is heavily loaded with economic bias. (AbouAssi, 2012). Accordingly,
‘exit’, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ are primarily economic behaviors, as opposed to
political or social behaviors.

In conclusion, the main argument here is that shifts in donor funding have
transformed the NGO sector in developing countries. The transformation is
perceived as being holistic and deterministic in that a single NGO cannot swim
against the flow and has to exhibit the same behavior as others. (AbouAssi, 2012).
However, this might not be—and it is more likely not—the case. One way to
understand NGOs’ behavior is to consider shifts in funding as a form of
deterioration in a relationship between a consumer (NGO) and a producer (donor).
Consequently, the following section examines the nature of the relationship
between NGOs and donors in an attempt to understand NGOs’ behavior and
reaction to shifts in donors’ priorities.
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UNDERSTANDING NGO BEHAVIOR

3.1. Relationship between States and NGOs
In developing countries, the relationship between the State and NGOs can take
one of three forms: dependency, collaboration, or confrontation. (Lorgan, 1998).
NGO dependency on the state is very rare due to the government’s will to control
the actions of NGOs and also due to the limitations of funds. Collaboration can
take place sometimes when NGOs work on policy issue, which is also not very
common. Douglas Webb (2004) suggests that “long-term sustainability ... lies in
the support that NGOs can provide to government rather than vice versa, and the
development of NGO capacity must not be at the expense of that within
government and public sector ranks”. (Webb, 2004: 22).
Confrontation is the most prominent form of relationship between states and
NGOs. The relationship between states and NGOs is identified as being
problematic. Due to political competition and lack of resources, the relationship
between some developing states and NGOs had proved to be extremely difficult
which has had negative implications for coordination of efforts. (Batsell, 2005).
Hence, the relationship between both actors proves to be weak and fragile. The
consequence of the weaknesses in the relationship between the state and NGOs is
translated in NGOs’ resorting to international donors for funding.
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3.2. Relationship between donors and NGOs
Most NGOs in the developing countries rely on international donors for policies
and funding. It is hard to make generalizations about the nature of the relationship
between donors and NGOs. However, most scholars who have studied the
peculiarities of the NGO-donor relationship, argue that donors usually dominate
the relationship. (Hook, 1995; Brinkerhoff and Coston, 1999; Martens, 2008). The
supply-led approach is the most prevailing in the NGO-donor relationship.
(Martens, 2008). Donors have interests to accommodate in return for providing
resources to NGOs.
Donors situate themselves outside of the local context, while in reality they are an
integral part of it. Not only are donor agencies acting as governmental
organizations executing the policies of their countries, they are also key players in
shaping the national policies of aid recipient countries. (Mitchell, 1991). Donor
agencies shape the national policies of recipient countries directly and indirectly
by negotiating priorities and controlling aid. They also establish direct and
indirect partnerships and networks with local actors, which lead, in some cases, to
the introduction of programs and strategies at odds with the local environment,
and in other cases, the reinforcement of existing social and economic inequalities.
(Mitchell, 1991). Hence, development can be crippled by those who claim to
support it.
The process of goal displacement can be deceptive. Bebbington (2004) uses the
term ‘intentional’ development to describe international aid channeled into
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programs with specific goals set by donor agencies and their partners, including
NGOs. Carothers and Ottaway (2000) note that the donors follow the same
approach everywhere: funding objectives are created in donors’ headquarters, a
completely different context and environment than where programs will be
implemented (Lindenberg and Bryant, 2001). Some of the assistance programs
take what the local people are familiar with and actually know and formulate it
into well-developed ideas that appeal to funding strategies and fit within current
development paradigms. The local people become sole recipients of assistance
instead of being the agents of change (Schlesinger, 2007: 60).
This is coupled with changes in the political economy of aid. Development
assistance retains a spotlight in the international policy agenda, but must compete
for resources and attention amidst concerns around peace, security, and antiterrorism (Bryant and Kappaz, 2005). The general commitment to aid is being
challenged. With a new global poverty agenda, countries had to review their
funding strategies and aid distribution (Bebbington, 2004). NGOs had to ‘explore
market-based approaches to development to sustain funding for services
provision. More emphasis has been placed on the scrutiny of funds, and
consequently on demonstrating evidence about the impact of development
programs. Arguably, the intended result was to quickly find success stories,
satisfy the interests of donors, and demonstrate impacts to secure additional
funding. However, the result is that the same group of people is continuously
targeted with development initiatives, limiting the scope of impact.
The second approach in the donor-NGOs relationship is the demand-led model.
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Golub (2000) calls for more “home-grown ideas of individuals and organizations
most likely to blend dedication, innovation and flexibility” (158). After all,
“development happens mainly through homegrown efforts” (Easterly, 2007: 29).
In a demand-led model, NGOs assume responsibility and take the initiative in
designing and presenting their agenda and preferences; donor agencies would then
place “consolidated resources at the disposal of local institutions that decide on
and own the uses to which they are put” (Edwards, Hulme and Wallace, 1999:
123). This recipient-donor approach is a process of mutual learning, transparency
and participation, and equal partnership (Doornbos, 2003).
The demand-led model in the donor-NGO relationship is participatory.
Participation challenges any monopoly in development. However, the approach
has received less attention compared to the supply-led approach, since,
admittedly, it is rare in the world of development aid.

3.3. The Question of Partnership
The term ‘partnership’ has increasingly been used in policy and practice to
describe the relationship between international donors and NGOs in developing
countries (Lister, 2000; Harrison, 2007). In this context, partnership is suggestive
of a qualitatively different type of relationship from that of international donors
merely working with NGOs in developing countries. The rhetoric of partnership is
based on the many supposed benefits that such a relationship may bring to
development work. Such benefits commonly fall into two groups. First,
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partnership may result in a more efficient and effective effort. For example, Lister
(2000) suggests that synergies derived from partnerships may make better use of
scarce resources and increase the sustainability of interventions. Secondly,
partnerships are believed to allow devolution of power with development
decisions being taken closer to local communities (Harrison, 2007) perhaps with
the direct involvement of potential beneficiaries (Lister, 2000). Harrison (2007:
391) goes as far as suggesting that the ‘rhetoric of partnership therefore focuses
on reversing the power relations in the aid chain’.
However, a number of authors question whether the developing rhetoric of
partnership signifies a change in relationships between international donors and
NGOs in developing countries. In terms of the actual relationships, Harrison
(2007) states that different agencies may have different conceptions of principles
underpinning, as well as the behaviors associated with, partnerships. Moreover,
Lister (2000: 228) criticizes partnership as a idea imposed by developed countries
and suggests that development of ‘authentic partnerships’ are constrained by the
control of funding retained by international donors. Summing up these factors,
Laird (2007: 467) argues that:
“Despite the rhetoric of partnership, NGOs in developing countries, whether
indigenous or the country programmes of international organizations, generally
acquiesce in the development agenda of donors or their northern-based head
offices.”
Seckinelgin (2004) makes a similar point, suggesting that the use of the term
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partnership commonly masks the ongoing power relations between NGOs and
international donors. Power relationships between international donors and NGOs
in developing countries are discussed by a wide variety of authors. The power of
international donors resides primarily in the funding that they make available.
Batsell (2001: 16) suggests that NGOs in developing countries become tied to the
agendas adopted by international donors. Similarly, Zaidi (1999) suggests that the
short-term and project-specific nature of funding results in NGOs working within
tight constraints and on highly specified tasks. More generally, the system of
funding from international donors has reduced the diversity of NGOs due to a
‘self-replicating’ process of funding being directed to the largest NGOs (Hulme
and Edwards, 1996).
Besides the generalities of the system of international funding, processes related
to accountability, such as monitoring and evaluation, are widely identified as
mechanisms that reinforce power relations. A number of authors report that NGOs
are increasingly becoming accountable to international donors rather than to the
communities with which they work (Zaidi, 1999). Moreover, imposed norms and
systems of monitoring and evaluation have additional effects on development
work by NGOs in developing countries. These effects include NGOs focusing on
short-term quantitative outputs (Zaidi, 1999), considering only their own
performance rather than co-operating with other NGOs and overlooking the longterm impact of provision (Seckinelgin, 2005).
Overall consequences of these power relations may have significant implications
for individual NGOs and the NGO sector as a whole. Hulme and Edwards (1996)
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suggests that the alterations to NGOs’ modes of operation engendered by funding
from international donors are continually reinforced and reproduced. This
suggestion is also recognized by Seckinelgin (2005: 359) who observes that
NGOs that participate in funding relationships, in which they are regarded as
service delivery tools gradually become disconnected from their community
relationships.
These effects create a paradox in which a supposed basis for NGOs’
effectiveness, their democratic relationships with local communities and
individuals, is undermined resulting in a reduced capacity to initiate social change
(Edwards and Hulme, 1996).

3.4. Shifts in Behavior: Donor priorities vs. Community based
Assessment

Being closer to the poor, NGOs are widely believed to provide better-targeted aid
than state agencies. It has traditionally been an article of faith (Tendler, 1982) that
NGOs are closer to the poor than official aid agencies, and that the allocation of
NGO aid is less distorted by commercial and political mandates of state agencies.
As for foreign aid, economic and political self-interest of donors appears to have
had an important impact on the allocation of aid across recipient countries
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006).
In several respects, NGOs may provide better-targeted aid than official donors.
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They are closer to the community and they know what they really need. However,
donor political or commercial interests have usually triumphed over the needsbased allocation of aid. The NGO might know best about the target groups that
need aid, yet because they do not have control over the funds; they end up
executing projects that are of more priority to the donors.
The dependence of many NGOs on external funding shapes their aid allocation.
They follow their donor interests in order to continue receiving grants.
Consequently, their aid allocation is no longer relevant in terms of targeting the
needy and deserving. Eventually, NGOs start allocating aid strategically by
targeting the less poor where success is easier to achieve. (Koch et al., 2007). In
other words, NGOs may be tempted to improve the chances of continued official
refinancing by demonstrating visible results that tend to be easier to achieve with
projects addressing less entrenched forms of poverty.
A prominent example of shifting behavior of NGOs is Lea Jellinek’s account of
an Indonesian NGO that started as a small grassroots-style microbank for women.
(Jellinek, 2003). Due to donor funding, it grew very rapidly in less than three
years and changed its focus to good governance programs. Jellinek (2003) states
that although the NGO is considered to be a great success with donors, the NGO’s
focus shifted from its original grassroots style and goal to support the poor to
being a “complex, top-down, technically oriented capital-intensive
bureaucracy…out of touch with what was happening on the ground”. (Jellinek,
2003: 179). The NGO focused on professionalization through the opening of more
offices, equipping them with computers and other technology, and spending time
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organizing formal events with government officials. However, the NGO’s daily
work involved less and less contact with the community, less democratic selection
procedures of community representatives, and limited delivery of programs that
actually reached the poor. Despite these problems, the organization’s growth and
professionalization increased its legitimacy with donors. (Jellinek, 2003).

In order to demonstrate success, NGOs are inclined to minimize risk which
weakens their incentive to operate in difficult environments where failure may
jeopardize future funding. Accordingly, NGOs may become completely delinked
from the local needs of the people. Abandoning the community needs assessment
entails neglecting the group that needed the aid the most. Donors, thus, dominate
the behavior of NGOs, and donor interest is prioritized over local needs.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONTEXTUALIZATION
OF THE NGO SCENE IN
EGYPT
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CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE NGO SCENE IN EGYPT (Since
2011)

4.1. The nature of Egypt’s NGO community
Egypt has the largest NGO sector in the Arab world, and commentators and
scholars often note how vibrant Egyptian civil society is in comparison with many
of its neighbors. (Pollock, 2013). Yet, until the recent transition in 2011, Egypt
was a repressive, semi-autocratic state, which routinely violated the human rights
of its citizens. It sought to maintain control of, or at least influence over, many
aspects of life, including civil society, and the laws governing Egyptian NGOs are
extremely restrictive. It remains in question how much this will change under the
revised constitution and the democratically elected government.
Egypt has a large and vibrant NGO sector, yet it also has restrictive laws
governing NGOs, and the government has frequently cracked down on the sector,
both before and after the 25 January Revolution. Therefore, the question is; what
explains the size and vibrancy of Egyptian civil society in the face of this
repression? After exploring the nature of the NGO sector in Egypt, it is estimated
that internal and external pressures on the Egyptian government as well as a lack
of state capacity for repression might explain the size of the NGO sector. The
Egyptian government intentionally promoted the growth of the NGO sector, while
using the state’s coercive power to influence these organizations. By both
promoting and manipulating NGOs, the state has been able to pursue several
objectives: providing social services with fewer state resources; co-opting
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organizations into behaving in accordance with state interests; pitting potential
opposition factions against one another; and improving the state’s image abroad
while discrediting liberalism at home. (Pollock, 2013). While the Revolution in
2011 brought renewed hope for legal reform, the future of NGOs in Egypt
remains unstable.
With over 90 million citizens and around 40,000 registered local NGOs, despite a
history of highly restrictive NGO laws, Egypt is described as having one of the
largest and most vital civil society sectors in the developing world. (Mikhail,
2014). The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) explains that
while the Egyptian government never used an outright ban on civil society, it
conveniently provided “enormous discretionary powers to the Ministry of Social
Solidarity.” (Mikhail, 2014).
Following the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and despite a rapid and insistent
expansion of civil society, the government’s relationship with NGOs only
worsened, due to multiple attempts to pass more restrictive laws and an actual
physical crackdown on existing NGOs. (Mikhail, 2014). Those organizations
were supposedly more committed and effective in reaching the poor than were the
governments of developing countries. The nature of their work requires NGOs to
interact with local communities on a daily basis, building relationships of
cooperation and trust to understand local needs and tailor projects that respond to
those needs. However, due to restrictive laws and lack of government resources,
several NGOs had to restructure their operations. Instead of having intimate
working relationships with the people of the community, several NGOs shifted
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their focus towards projects that suit new partnerships with foreign donor
agencies. (Pullock, 2013).

4.2. Foreign funding in Egypt after 2011
Prior to the outbreak of revolution on 25 January 2011, Egypt’s vibrant civil
society already played an important role in raising public awareness. In the
aftermath of the revolution, however, controversy over foreign funding to
Egyptian NGOs within both the Egyptian press and the general public grew. The
underlying problems stem, to a large extent, from the deficient legal framework
that regulates the work of NGOs in Egypt. Many NGOs are forced to accept
foreign funding due to the lack of domestic funds, from donations, endowments,
and other sources of charity, and the abuse by the regime of the few governmental
resources available. The Mubarak regime took advantage of the existing legal
loopholes in order selectively to punish or reward NGOs according to their
political line. The former regime also used the issue of ‘foreign funding’ to
discredit certain NGOs or civil society’s call for democratic reform in general.
While some critics in Egypt are genuinely suspicious of the intentions of
externally- funded organizations, others distort their role in an attempt to stain
their image in the eyes of the public. (Elagati, 2013).
Public opinion had some concerns about foreign funding. According to Mohamed
Elagati (2013), there are several negative aspects of NGO foreign funding in
Egypt. The main negative aspects include: donors forcing a specific agenda onto
the general work of the organization; flawed legislation governing foreign
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funding; unwillingness amongst NGOs to reveal sources and amounts of foreign
funding, as well as the conditions under which it was granted; donor intervention
in the work of these organizations; creating ‘local agents’ for the donor states’
vested interests; foreign funding inciting the creation of projects by local NGOs
only for the sake of securing funding; the misuse of foreign funds by some NGOs
for illicit purposes, giving a negative image to foreign institutions and civil
society as a whole; the risk of civil society corruption and the creation of a new
class of Egyptians working with foreign organizations that depend on foreign
money; abundant foreign funding reducing Egyptian NGOs’ preparedness to
search for local sources of funding, thus weakening the development of local
alternatives; and the risk of a long-term structural dependence of Egyptian NGOs
on foreign funding. (Elagati, 2013).
These concerns, however, did not fundamentally affect the presence or influence
of foreign donors in Egypt. Most international donors have increased their
funding for Egyptian NGOs after the revolution, focusing their activities more
strongly on civil participation, supporting youth, the media, freedom of
information and political participation, as well as social justice. (Elagati, 2013).
Moreover, important governmental donors such as USAID and the European
Commission have scrapped controversial pre-revolutionary policies of requiring
civil society grants to be cleared with the Egyptian authorities first.
According to an investigation file on NGO foreign funding submitted to the Cairo
Criminal Court by the investigating authorities in February 2012, Investigative
Judges Sameh Abu-Zeid and Ashraf el Ashrawy claimed that 95 per cent of the
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money spent by the investigated foreign organizations came from the US. The
report claimed that prior to the revolution, US organizations spent around $1
million per year in Egypt; after the revolution, their workload increased
substantially and funds amounted to $18 million in one year. The investigation
also demonstrated that approximately 95 per cent of funds during the past year
were used to support the work of new post-revolution entities. (Elagati, 2013).
The scope of this study does not allow for an exhaustive or representative
overview of all foreign funding provided to Egyptian organizations. However, in
financial terms, among the most important foreign supporters of democratic
reform and civil society in Egypt are governmental and non-governmental donors
from the European Union and the United States, as well as international
multilateral organizations. Important non- governmental sources include the Ford
Foundation, Freedom House, and the Arab Human Rights Fund. Moreover, a
broad range of foreign NGOs provides technical assistance in supporting
‘political’ civil society. These include notably the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International
Republican Institute (IRI), and German political party foundations, including the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, and the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation.
Understanding the role of civil society in Egypt before and after the revolution is
not possible without a detailed understanding of the question of financing.
Understanding the question of funding is the key to explaining the changing
behavior and interests of NGOs in Egypt.
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4.3. Shifts in interests and specialization
After the 25 January Revolution in 2011, foreign donor preferences have shifted
more towards the concept of ‘democratic transition’. Foreign donors showed a
keen interest in playing a large role in shaping the country’s transition towards
democracy. When donor interests shifted towards the focus on democratic
development, NGOs that relied on or needed foreign funding in Egypt, in most
cases, had three choices: tailor their projects based on donor priorities (loyalty),
negotiate with donors to receive funds related to their original vision (voice), or to
quit (exit). The available research material on NGOs in Egypt demonstrates that
the two situations that are more likely to occur are either ‘loyalty’ or ‘exit’. The
following section illustrates examples of cases that occurred in Egypt that explain
how a shift in donor interests can affect NGO behavior.

4.3.1. USAID
Just a few weeks after Mubarak’s regime was toppled, the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) directed some $65 million towards
"democratic development” programmes in Egypt, out of total economic and civil
assistance estimated at around $200 million in 2010/2011. (El-din, 2011).

USAID made a big shift in its funding priorities in Egypt. The Egyptian
government itself notes that USAID has played an active role in rebuilding the
Egyptian economy over more than 30 years. Furthermore, there is no question that
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USAID has played an enormous role in improving Egypt’s infrastructure,
especially in the sectors of telecommunications, electricity, health and sanitary
drainage.” Official figures show that USAID has offered Egypt more than $50
billion in civil assistance over 40 years. (El-din, 2011).

Since 2011, USAID has showed great interest in funding projects related to
democratic transition in Egypt. There is no denying that democratic transition in
Egypt matters immensely to the United States strategically. US Ambassador to
Egypt Ann Patterson clearly stated: “It matters to our allies, and it will serve as a
model for the rest of the Arab world”. (El-din, 2011). The USAID has allocated
millions of dollars to democratic development programmes. It has granted $105
million to various non-governmental organizations to assist with their
participation in the political life of the country. (El-din, 2011).

According to a Middle East Online study on US aid in Egypt, more than one
thousand Egyptians have lined up to submit proposals at USAID’s Cairo office to
obtain grants allocated to democratic transition programmes. (El-din, 2011).
While a significant number of NGOs shifted their priorities in accordance with the
USAID new interests in order to receive funds, other NGOs such as the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) has declined to apply for grants from the
USAID. Hafez Abu Saeda, chairman of the Egyptian Organization for Human
rights, in a statement to Ahram online has indicated that NGOs that accept money
from USAID should be very clear about its objectives rather than the NGOs’
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original objectives. (El-din, 2011). In other words, USAID will always prioritize
the United States’ strategic interests in Egypt over the interest of the people at the
community level. The EOHR was fortunate, however, because its funding
depended on local sources and other foreign donors. Hence, a shift in donor
priority did not affect the behavior of this particular NGO because it had other
sources for survival.

4.3.2. NED
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) “was launched in the early
1980s, premised on the idea that American assistance on behalf of democracy
efforts abroad would be good both for the U.S. and for those struggling around the
world for freedom and self-government.” (NED). NED has never shifted its
interests; democracy has always been its priority. After 25 January revolution,
NED became interested in Egypt more than ever before because it initiated a path
towards democratic transition. During my internship at the Arab House
Foundation for Human Rights (AHFHR), I got to meet the program officer of the
Middle East North Africa region working for NED, Ms. Tatjana Sharif-San Luis.
Ms. Luis informed me prior to her visit that she was coming to Egypt and wanted
to meet with the NGO staff and discuss the work we do. During her visit, I got to
talk to her about my thesis and she was very helpful in answering some of the
questions I had. I asked her why did NED send a program officer after they have
already approved the proposal sent by the NGO. She answered by saying that they
had installed a new system where NGOs only receive an initial approval based on
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the project proposal submitted and then a program officer has to visit the NGO for
a second and final approval. When I asked her about the importance of the second
approval, she replied stating that over the past year they have received over
hundreds of proposals that look good on paper, however, from NGOs that had no
prior experience in democratic development. NED realized that projects were
being tailored in accordance with their objectives for the sake of funding. Her
final comments were about how NGOs in Egypt have become resource dependent
to a significant extent where interests are being changed and priorities are being
set for the sake of receiving the grant.

The aforementioned examples of NGOs and foreign donor agencies are a few
examples of the relationship between both entities. The following chapter will
investigate a case study of the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights in
detail.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE STUDY
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CASE STUDY
ARAB HOUSE FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

5.1. Case Profile
5.1.1. Operating Context
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is an association focused on
awareness programs. Consequently, it works with experts on human rights to create
activities not only in Cairo, but more importantly in governorates that are less
privileged. This kind of association works on community-based projects, hence, it is
of great importance that those communities understand the nature of the association
and the projects it implements. For this reason, AHFHR staff not only make plans for
the project, but more importantly, each and every single member of the staff is
involved in the implementation process of every project until the very end. This
creates good relationships with community members, which facilitates the
implementation process of the project and enhances a positive feedback towards the
foundation’s activities.

5.1.2. History
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is a newly established association. It
received approval as a development organization on March 2013. Since then,
AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to human rights
awareness in Egypt. The foundation has tried to cover all news related to human
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rights violations in Egypt and post them on its webpage to increase awareness among
readers. Furthermore, the association has organized workshops and training sessions
to teach members of society from several governorates in Egypt about their basic
human rights and how to call for them.

5.1.3. Overall Mission
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is a local Egyptian association founded
under the Egyptian law of Non-Governmental Organizations. AHFHR believes that
nations will not develop unless every individual’s rights are respected. This can be
achieved only after they become aware of their rights and how to call for those rights.
This explains the role of the association. It is its ultimate vision.

5.1.4. Institutional structure
Being a newly established association, the institutional structure of the AHFHR is not
a complex one. Basically it is consisted of three segments. The first segment is the
Upper Council, which administers all formal decisions and plans in the association.
The upper council comprises four positions of the senior staff. Those positions are:
the president of the council, vice president of the council, General Secretary, and the
treasurer. The president of the council, Mr. Ehab Rady, is responsible for top
management decisions and plans executed within the foundation. Along with Mr.
Rady, the vice president is there to plan activities and organize the team needed for
every activity carried out by the foundation. The general secretary is another
important member of the team, as he organizes not only all meetings within the upper
65

council, but more importantly organizes all business trips, interviews volunteers, and
schedules training sessions and workshops. The final member of the upper council is
the treasurer. This person is responsible for taking care of the finance of the
association as well as finding possible sources of funding.

The second segment is the Experts Council. This council is responsible for
investigating, researching, and studying the most problematic issues in regards to
human rights in Egypt. It looks at key issues and considers how the foundation might
tackle them. This council works under the supervision of the president of the
association, who makes the final decision on which key issues are more relevant.
The third segment of the institutional structure is the Volunteering Team. This team is
where all the magic happens. Part of those volunteers are prominent figures in
society: parliamentary candidates, university professors, journalists, or human rights
activists. Those are the part of the volunteering team responsible for giving trainings.
However, the workshop itself is organized by the upper council along with another set
of younger volunteers. This set of volunteers act as organizers for the workshop.
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Figure 3: AHFHR's Organizational Structure

5.1.5. NGO’s Objective
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights’ main objective is to spread awareness
amongst citizens about their basic human rights and how to call for them.


Teaching citizens about their human rights and how can they protect them.



Executing basic human rights awareness programs in the least privileged
governorates in Egypt.



Stressing the importance of a dignified life for everyone.



Reaching out to a larger group of the community who has been suffering from
human rights abuse.
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5.1.6. Approach towards achieving its objectives
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights adopts a participatory approach to
development. This foundation is based on engaging the civil society in every project
or activity undertaken by the AHFHR. This approach is driven by its main objective
of empowering civil society members through engaging them in training and
workshops in order to enhance their participation as active members in society.

5.1.7. Relationship with its constituency
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights, unlike other associations, does not focus
on one specified target group. The foundation looks at the community as a whole.
Since its main focus is human rights problems in Egypt, the foundation believes that
what it is offering is suitable for all sectors of society. In every project, it tries to
reach out to all individuals in Egypt. AHFHR has implemented its projects up till now
in Cairo, Alexandria, Qena, Al-Gharbia, and Bani-Sweif. In the future, the foundation
is planning to cover the governorates in Egypt, particularly in the least privileged
areas where teaching them about their rights is very essential, particularly in today’s
world.

The relationship between the foundation and its public is a very friendly one. It is
based on guidance and assistance. This participatory approach to development in
which civil society and target groups participate in the development process and are
essential players in the implementation process guarantees more sustainability. This
approach gives the beneficiaries a sense of ownership and belonging to the project
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and their capacities are built to carry out the acquired skills and activities after the end
of the project. Thus, the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights implements its
projects through working with the community.

5.1.8. Relationship with other organizations
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is part of a congregation of 76 human
rights organizations in Egypt. Almost 40 of those associations- including AHFHRhave very strong bonds due to their similar agendas. AHFHR’s relationship with the
rest of those organizations is a very good one. They issue reports and cover news
under one auspice. AHFHR does not have any conflicts with other human rights
organizations. It does not seek to compete with other organizations, however;
AHFHR seeks to complete the overall job of supporting human rights in Egypt.

5.1.9. Sources of funding
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is based on personal private funding.
However, lately the foundation has been communicating with aid institutions for
external funding. The foundation initially refused to accept any foreign funding
because of the suspicion of foreign intervention and foreign agendas. However,
relying on private funding established that there cannot be assured sustainability in
any of the projects executed. This led the foundation to start drafting proposals for
reputable aid institutions to fund its programs.
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Table 1: Summary of AHFHR's Case Profile
AHFHR
Mission

Human Rights Awareness

Reason for establishment

Group Commitment

Key turning point

Arab Spring

Stakeholders

Local Communities

Participatory Approach

In practice

Members’ role

Decision making and implementation

Executive Committee

4 members

Internal governance

Low leadership/no clear division of
authorities

Decision-making process

Agreement and consensus

Transparency

Members’ access and internal reporting

Gender representation in leadership

Male

Human resources

Project-based and volunteers

Professional expertise

External

Type of activities

Awareness and projects

Needs assessment

Local needs

Relationship with state government

Limited complementarity

Relationship with donors

New/Formal/Necessary/Negotiative

Relationship with other NGOs

Strong/Stable

Relationship with media

Activities’ reporting
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5.2. Findings
The extent to which the association of Arab House Foundation for Human Rights
succeeded in achieving its objectives or not, can only be determined by looking at the
outcomes and results of the projects and activities executed by the foundation.
Throughout my internship, I realized that the association gave much more than it
received. In other words, the association provided much by way of news coverage
throughout the three months of my internship by giving news of human rights on its
webpage. Hence, the web-page of the foundation was successful enough to cover
news from a non-biased approach; however, it was not very successful in reaching out
to all citizens who do not have access to the association’s page. At the same time, the
mainstream media did not normally cover the successful other activities by AHFHR.

As for these, which included workshops and training sessions, the association brought
prominent figures and experts on human rights to give sessions in Cairo and other
governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very organized and beneficial and
attracted a number of participants. However, as they did not offer anything but
knowledge, the foundation had difficulty in attracting large numbers of members of
the community.

AHFHR could have been more successful had it received funds to create projects and
activities on a larger scale. Those projects are too good to be done only once or heard
of only by a few. Media coverage of those projects could have led to awareness
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among a larger number of members of the community. One project that proved to be
very successful was “Preparing a new generation to become human rights activists”.
This project was intended to prepare the candidates that volunteered to lead future
projects. Several news channels and online pages covered this project. It also attracted
the attention of several members of the community.

There is no doubt that AHFHR is facing serious challenges. From an objective
perspective, the foundation has difficulty in growing or becoming one of the more
prominent Egyptian human rights associations for the following reasons:

5.2.1. Challenge #1: The question of funding
The number one challenge without doubt is funding. For any organization to grow, it
needs financial resources flowing into the organization. However, being a non-profit
organization based on personal funding, AHFHR finds it very hard to create any
sustainability or even enlarge its ongoing projects.

5.2.2. Challenge #2: Timely administrative procedures
The administrative procedures take far too much time and energy. For every activity,
a lot of time is wasted while waiting for a certain signature or specific paper work
needed for the execution of the activity. During this lost time, the organization’s
projects are seriously hindered.

5.2.3. Challenge #3: Timely security approvals
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Another challenge is the time lost in security approvals. The bureaucratic procedures
needed for every project are very time consuming. This lost time also hinders the
organization’s pace towards achieving its plans and activities in a timely manner.

5.2.4. Challenge #4: Difficulty in finding volunteers
Arab House Foundation for Human Rights relies to a great extent on volunteers. Just
like any other organization, finding volunteers is not an easy task particularly if the
organization is still a newly established one. Thus, AHFHR has a hard time finding
volunteers ready to commit to fulfilling the tasks of the organization as well as to
travelling around the governorates of Egypt.

Throughout the last days of my internship, I came to the most important finding of
all. During the final stage of my internship, everything changed when I started
helping the upper council to write proposals to be submitted to aid agencies to request
funding for the NGO. At that time, the organization was facing financial problems
and was starting to feel that it could not rely anymore on private funding. The
AHFHR, then, had decided to work on a proposal calling for funding from
international donors. The NGO was advised that the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) was accepting proposals. The Upper Council immediately
started working on drafting a proposal on one of the projects that had not been
completed due to lack of resources.
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AHFHR was initially working on a project enhancing higher education capacity in
Egypt. Throughout the year 2013, UNDP’s priority theme for funding was
‘responsive institutions’. This description perfectly applied to the NGO’s proposed
project. However, the UNDP suddenly shifted its priority areas to favor ‘democratic
governance’ and ‘gender equality’. When donors offered a novel source of funding
that attracted the attention of numerous NGOs, AHFHR was encouraged to undergo
organizational changes, in order to develop potentially eligible projects and also to
communicate with officials distributing the grants to access information helpful in
acquiring funding.

In order to survive, the AHFHR, correspondingly, shifted its behavior into ‘adjusting’
its project to fit with the new priorities of the UNDP. Later, the NGO contacted other
donors with the same priority areas: the National Endowment Fund (NED) and the
United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF). (see Appendix B & Appendix C).
The major drawback, however, is that when AHFHR adapted its agenda to the
priorities of donor programs, it led the organization to abandon its initial aims and
field of activity.

5.3. Reflection and analysis
Sadly, the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights probably lacks the means to
ensure the sustainability of the projects. The range of activities undertaken by the
NGO requires economic capital and trained personnel. The lack of both will not allow
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the projects to continue on their own. For the first nine months of its existence, the
NGO functioned within clearly defined limits. However, once the environment
altered, the foundation changed its goal in order to meet the new expectations of
donors. In doing so, the NGO shifted its projects, scope of work and target group. It
may well also have become largely irrelevant to its original purpose.

AHFHR abandoned its role towards its primary stakeholders. The team became
incapable of fulfilling their responsibilities. The organization starting proposing
projects that were not of high priority to residents of those unprivileged areas. This
abandonment of the community’s needs and priorities led to a huge disappointment
accompanied by mistrust towards the NGO. This vulnerable group of people lost any
hope they had towards the future. However, because the NGO was on the verge of
collapsing it shifted its behavior and changed its objectives.

Arab House Foundation for Human Rights’ new objective changed to spreading
awareness in the new path towards democracy so that every citizen could participate
and know that their voices can and will be heard. The new objective of the NGO
meant that their new focus is not basic human rights anymore. While the AHFHR did
not undergo a paradigm shift, however, they integrated their original objectives with
the greater goals of the donor. While on paper, this was not considered an enormous
shift; it led to the abandonment of the basic needs of the local community while
prioritizing the interest of the donor. Furthermore, their target group is no longer the
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least privileged areas governorates either. The immediate objectives of the NGO
became:


Teaching citizens about their human rights and how can they protect it.



Acting as a further stepping stone towards democratic development in Egypt.



Spread political awareness among a larger group of the community.



Stressing the importance of freedom of thought and expression.



Providing support for journalists who are trying to provide citizens with the
reality of the situation in Egypt.



Enabling political participation of women.

This shift in behavior and objectives constitutes an application of Hirschman’s ‘Exit,
voice, and loyalty’ model.

5.3.1. A behavioral shift

The previous section in this chapter highlights the main findings during my internship
at the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights in 2013; the reasons that led me to
investigate why organizations behave the way they do. The time I spent at the
AHFHR allowed me to see the point where organizations will switch behavior the
minute they feel threatened to survive. What organizations might not admit to the
public, I was in a place where information about the NGO could not be hidden.
During my internship I was inside a real life experience of an organization shifting
behavior in order to fit with donor priorities in return for resources.
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AHFHR was designed to take local priorities into account. Selecting the parties to
receive NGO assistance was based on identifying the most deprived groups in
underprivileged governorates in Egypt. The NGO was based on the idea of improving
their living conditions through awareness programs to teach them about their rights
and how to call for them. Furthermore, the NGO’s program of establishing a new
generation of human rights activists promised a lot of job vacancies since the people
who are attending those workshops were supposed to work in their governorate in the
following year. The plan was to provide a sustainable project, run later by the
beneficiaries themselves who have acquired the highest level of attendance to the
workshops in the entire year where the project is implemented. The NGO was
expected to leave more responsibilities to the primary stakeholders to make them feel
more involved. The NGO was supposed to mobilize their members to work in the
projects to gain appreciation and credibility in their local community. Hence, the
outcome of this project would have led to supporting a long-term local recreation in
this community. It was expected to enhance broader participation every year that
could have changed people’s lives. Unfortunately, due to lack of resources, the NGO
had to shift its behavior and projects.

The following section concentrates on the developments that occurred in the
foundation over the past two years. Since the end of my internship, I have been
following the behavioral shift that the AHFHR has been going through. It began with
a public announcement by the executive director of the Arab House Foundation for
Human rights to “Sada El-Balad”. (Othman, 2014). He, openly, denounced the attack
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on foreign funding stressing that foreign funding does not cause any harm (something
the organization was against initially). He mentioned that with over 40,000
organizations in Egypt, only 450 organizations are receiving external funding
according to the Ministry of Social Solidarity. (Othman, 2014). Furthermore, in his
announcement, he addressed the government on its role in getting involved and
communicating with foreign donors to expand their grants to reach a larger number of
NGOs in Egypt. His announcement was only a beginning to the NGO’s behavioral
shift.

In 2014, the NGO started working on programs and drafting proposals focusing on
democratic transitions and youth encouragement. Leaving their original target group
in the least privileged governorates led to deterioration in all the past projects that the
AHFHR was initially working on. Projects related to preparing a new generation of
human rights activists, enhancing the education capacity in poor areas, and the
awareness programs about human rights had no more resources to continue. Being a
resource dependent NGO, the AHFHR had no option but to work on the popular
projects that were actually receiving funds. In 2014, donors like NED, UNDP, and
UNDEF were all focusing their grants on projects related to democratic transition in
the Middle East and youth encouragement. Consequently, the AHFHR shifted not
only their objectives, but their behavior as well. This shift resulted in donor
acceptance of the new projects by the AHFHR.
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In 2015, there was another shift in the NGO’s behavior based on a shift in donor
priorities. Donors shifted their focus towards projects related to women
empowerment and gender equality. Hence, in 2015, the AHFHR started working on a
project related to risks and abuses faced by women in Egypt, and how they can
overcome them.

The shift of donor priorities is due to the fact that they no longer need so many NGOs
pushing for transitional democracy. Instead, the focus shifted to women
empowerment as an element perceived as required in the Middle East by foreign
donors. The immediate effect of every shift by foreign donors is that numerous
programs initiated by NGOs in Egypt become abandoned. AHFHR, like many other
NGOs, find itself at the mercy of the agendas and priorities of foreign donors. The
grass-roots issues addressed by local NGOs in Egypt often do not correlate with the
international issues upon which their funding is based, and this incompatibility
creates uncertainty for many programs. Unfortunately, students who may have had a
better chance in getting educated and youth who could have become better
individuals aware of their rights in very remote areas have failed to receive any
tangible benefit after this behavioral shift.

AHFHR already face an uphill battle with a lack of resources and experience. The
current process for providing developmental assistance lacks long-term sustainability
because funding priorities are not always in accord with local needs and programming
cycles. The insecurity brought about by shifting foreign agendas is just one more
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challenge for the NGO. More importantly, it is one more barrier preventing it from
improving the standard of living for its community.

The events that occurred in the recent years have shifted the focus of foreign donors
as the development budget is tied to national interest. Once again this is what
eventually leads to the abandonment of programs, leaving many communities to fend
for themselves. The cycle of short-term projects and insecurity for NGOs, who are
reliant on foreign funding, continues.

5.3.2. Explaining behavior according to Hirschman

The question of how NGOs in developing countries react to shifts in donor agencies’
funding is applicable to the case of the Arab House foundation for Human rights.
When the National Endowment for Democracy accepted the AHFHR’s project on
youth empowerment in the process of democratic transition in 2014, the organization
became resource dependent on NED. All their work during that year was focused on
the role of youth under the new regime in Egypt. However, when NED shifted its
priority the following year to women empowerment, AHFHR started re-evaluating its
agenda, again, due to concerns regarding the future prospects for donor support.
Consequently, the NGO started preparing new eligible projects on women
empowerment in order to match donor priorities.
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Due to funding concerns, AHFHR while working under the same umbrella of human
rights, shifted its approach more than once towards projects that of priority to the
donor rather than of priority to the local community. Emerging funding trends
suggested that NGOs could increase sustainability by seeking financial and technical
support from donors on the condition of prioritizing their interests in the region.

According to Hirschman, the NGO is this case clearly chose the ‘loyalty’ option as a
mode of behavior. As mentioned previously, ‘loyalty’ in this paradigm means
adjustment. When an NGO has no other alternative to allocate resources, it does not
have the privilege to ‘voice’ or ‘exit’. In seeking survival, the NGO’s only choice was
to alter and modify its objectives to fit with donor priorities.
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CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
The acquisition and sustainability of financial resources continue to be paramount
challenges for non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Contrary to other institutions,
which rely on generating profits from selling products or services, NGOs seek financial
resources mainly from international donors. However, due to continuous fluctuations,
receiving international funds is not promised. This case study establishes that since
NGOs’ survival may rely on these funds, their performances will not only take donors’
interests into consideration but often even prioritize them. Hence, resource allocation has
possibly become the major determinant of NGO behavior and decisions.
Research on NGOs has established that resource dependence theory does much to explain
the relationship between donor funding and NGO behavior. Resource dependence theory
suggests that the form of behavior of an NGO is a reflection of its dependence on an
external actor for resources. The level of resource dependence affects, and possibly
determines, the behavior of the NGO.
The relationship between resource dependence and an NGO’s decision to shift its
behavior can also be explained through Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ model. The
higher the resource dependence of an organization, the more likely it will practice the
‘loyalty’ concept. However, the lower the resource dependence of an organization, the
more likely it will practice the ‘voice’ or ‘exit’ options. In other words, when the NGO
has various alternative options to allocate resources, it will tend to be less controlled by
the donor. Conversely, the more loyal and dependent the NGO is on certain donors, the
more their behavior will always be along the lines of prioritizing donor interests.
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My contribution to scholarly debates on NGO-donor relations is not focused on labeling
NGOs or donors as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Instead, it is an attempt to understand NGO behavior.
Regardless of their success or failure, there is an unhealthy relationship between donors
and NGOs. It is a realist world where all actors will seek self-interest. The developmental
problem here is that NGOs are the closest institution to local communities. It is the
institution that best understand their needs. How can communities develop when their
closest ally is prioritizing donor interests rather than community interests?
NGOs are caught in the dependency trap. Since NGOs are resource insufficient, the fate
of their local communities will usually be in the hands of the donor. Donors who live in
different communities and have different interests dictate what kind of projects NGOs
can work on. Consequently, most resource dependent NGOs are choosing overlapping
projects while neglecting crucial projects that could be more essential to the local
community. In order to survive, NGOs will shift their behavior in order to sustain donor
funding rather than responding to people’s needs.
The case of Egyptian NGOs is only an illustration of the NGO-donor relationship in
developing countries in general. NGOs in Egypt after the 25 January revolution have
experienced a dependency trap. The lack of government resources led NGOs to pursue
foreign funding. The more dependent the NGO is, the higher the probability that it will
shift interests in accordance with donor priorities. Local needs of people are not being
addressed because if their problem is not already on the donor agenda then it does not
become a priority.
The case of the Arab House Foundation for Human Rights focuses on how NGOs
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respond to changes in their environment, specifically how they react to shifts in donor
funding. NGOs are increasingly replacing government agencies as providers of social
services, yet they often rely on private donors for funding. As a result, NGOs may
experience a tension between upward and downward accountability. On the one hand,
NGOs are accountable to the community they serve. On the other hand, to the extent that
they depend on external funding, NGOs are also accountable to their donors. This case,
while faces several limitations, supports the hypothesis by touching upon the tension
between upward and downward accountability, reaching the point where NGOs’ resource
dependence will result in shifting priorities to align with donor interests.
The question, “why do NGOs adopt perspectives and priorities derived from funding
sources”, has essentially been answered throughout the foregoing pages. The answer
itself boils down to a distilled awareness that Human Rights-focused NGOs involve only
small numerical percentages of the populations of Third World societies, that awareness
of Human Rights issues is limited in such contexts, that Human Rights issues may be
very divisive questions in many Third World contexts, and that funding remains
problematical for many, if not most, Human Rights-Focused NGOs in the Third World.
In short, then, the answer to the research question raised above is that the combination of
real material needs to work on behalf of Human Rights and an equally real lack of
material means to accomplish this goal combine to pressure Human Rights-focused
NGOs to adopt perspectives and priorities derived from funding sources.

Derivative sub-questions can now also be addressed:
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To what extent does resource dependence theory help explain today’s
relationships between NGOs and donors? I would say to “a great extent”.



Why are international donors the major contributors of NGO funding rather than
state agencies? I would suggest that impressionistic evidence from the Egyptian
scene suggests that human rights issues are divisive in the Third World; so
international funding is an attractive option.



What impact does donors’ decision to change their funding priorities have on
NGO’s established priorities? The evidence from the case study suggests the
answer to this would be: NGOs tend to modify their own priorities in order to
remain compatible with those of funding agencies.

Recommendations
Donors should revisit their funding strategies and mechanisms. They ought to
relax the conditionality of funding and be more inclusive in tackling development
projects. If donors want to see NGOs make a real change in people’s lives, they
will have to let the NGO work since NGOs are more aware of what local
communities need. Nevertheless, NGOs have the bigger role in overcoming the
complications in the NGO-donor relationship. NGOs should include donor
interests but not prioritize it. Whenever donor interests are not parallel to the
needs of the target group, NGOs have to practice the ‘voice’ option and say ‘no’.
NGOs should empower themselves through a powerful vision. Only then can an
NGO resist shifting its performance and commit to its original objectives. NGOs
and donors are responsible for finding a way where not only both can benefit, but
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more importantly the beneficiaries that they have responsibility towards.

Limitations


This research focus on the behavior of an NGO in real setting, however, it is
based on only three months of observation.



While qualitatively rich, this research lacks a quantitative significance. There is
only one case study in this research due to the difficulty of interviewing other
NGOs and expecting them to give similar information. It is hard for NGOs to
admit that they are prioritizing donor interest because they need resources.



The research does not extensively go into detail about the reason behind donors’
shifts in projects and changing priority areas.



The research was limited to NGOs in developing countries. NGOs in developed
countries may not face similar situations.

I consider both the findings and the limitations of the research to be potential
opportunities for future research and examination.
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APPENDIX A: TRAINING CERTIFICATE

Arab House Foundation for Human Rights
Date: 19/11/2013
To whom it may concern,
This is to certify that Miss Rana Reda El Gawish, a graduate student in the
Faculty of Political Science at the American University in Cairo (Major in
Development) has successfully completed three months long internship
(from July 1st 2013 to September 30th 2013). During the period of her
internship, she was found punctual, strict to deadlines, hardworking, team
player, and had excellent analytical skills.
We wish her every success in life.

EHAB RADY
Authorized Signature

Facebook page:
https://www.facebook.com/ArabHouseFoundationForHumanRights?ref=ts&fref=ts#!/Ar
abHouseFoundationForHumanRights
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APPENDIX B: PROJECT PROPOSAL

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
PROJECT PROPOSAL
1. SUMMARY
Decentralization is one of the reforms that states need to adopt to recover from oppressive
authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic governance regime. The road is not easy
and the milestones need to be met. This project arises out of a new constitutional
framework that prioritizes women and youth. Its main aim is to enhance their ultimate
participation in the political life. This project is taking place during the transitional period
that Egypt is going through. This period requires the investment of all range of societal
factions, in particular the marginalized and incapable groups, to enhance their political
participation.
Egypt now is experiencing a transitional period from a highly centralized state to a
decentralized one. After the constitutional referendum, it is estimated that 50% of the
Local People’s Councils seats will be for women and youth. Accordingly, this project is
significant as it aims to empower the youth and women, particularly in marginalized
areas in governorates, to establish Local People’s Councils that fights corruption. This
will only be attained through active members who are well aware of their responsibilities
and duties. The project will achieve its objectives through studies, training, and
monitoring members during the local elections.
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2. BACKGROUND
Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through lacking their
political rights through today’s democratic governance systems prevailing in democratic
countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite dominating political life with no hope of
alternation of power caused Egypt’s economic and political problems. They also realized
that the corrupt government is incapable of delivering public services to its people and is
a root cause for the lack of equal opportunity.

Democratic transition in Egypt has faced several impediments which led people today to
lose their hope and belief in a democratic rule to occur. The new drafted constitution,
however, provides a significant importance to localities through the Local People’s
councils. Those councils are the only way towards true representation. Citizens have a
chance where their voice could be heard, where their voice can actually matter. The most
important question is how can we ensure that those localities will neither be corrupt nor
insignificant? The proposed project, thus, creates a chance for those localities to make a
difference in people’s lives. Those localities will only function correctly if the citizens are
empowered. The project’s target group is the youth and women as they make up about
50% of the new law for localities. The organization seeks to target youth and women in
the most marginalized areas in the state. Those people are the key towards a true
representation in localities if they become aware of their rights and knew how to call for
it.
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3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES


An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils.



Drafting a new law for local people’s councils.



Awareness program



Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women

4. PROJECT ACTIVITIES
Objective 1:


An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils.

Relevant Activities:
o Surveys


Research team to put a plan and expert to analyze and create
recommendations



Workshop: to evaluate the results and how to use it (with the
attendance of the ministry and parliament representatives).

Objective 2:


Drafting a new law for local people’s councils
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There is a problem in the law that has been continuing for years. Hence of the activities
of the project is lobbying for a new draft law that calls for decentralization, transparency,
accountability, fighting corruption, and supports the youth with consideration that the
new drafted constitution states that 50% of the seats in the localities is for youth and
women. In addition, the current law from 1979 has not changed up till today.
Relevant activities:
o Experts committee for preparing a draft of the new law for local people’s
councils which aims to issue a new project law that ensures achieving the
objectives.
o Community discussions to all range of all political streams and classes
(civil society, parties, sects) about the draft law.
o Interviews and meeting with decision makers, government, and minister
for local development.
o Suggest a final draft to the law to give it to the government and decision
makers to pressure its issuing. Pressure can also be through the parliament
to enforce this new drafted law.
o After its acceptance,


Create awareness programs



Provide training for members of Local People’s Councils.



Provide training for target groups (women, youth, civil society,
youth members of parties) in 27 governorates through the seven
provinces. Ex: El delta province, canal cities province, South
Upper Egypt province.
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Objective 3:


Awareness program

Relevant Activities:
o Production of media and art works through caricatures and promos in the
social media and television from 1 to 10 minutes maximum. This aims to
spread awareness and simplify the information and ease its delivery to all
range of society (vulnerable and illiterate in villages and distanced areas).


These works will be used in training programs and workshops, as
well as publishing them in the social media and television.

o Establish a newsletter that aims to illustrate the project‘s importance and
its outputs.


Communications tool with the target group to publish the
aforementioned arts works.

o Create brochures to illustrate the project team and the objectives of this
project to be distributed on the target group and beneficiaries.
o Public meetings with the target group to spread awareness about the
importance of participation in the elections of the local councils.
Objective 4:


Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women

Relevant Activities:
Two types of trainings:
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1. Training possible candidates to become: active, aware, skilled to
perform all tasks relevant to people’s needs.
2. Training sessions to team to spread awareness amongst people in
coordination with civil societies in the targeted areas.

5. EVALUATION PLAN


The project will be monitored on regular basis by the project management team to
ensure that all activities are taking place as scheduled and with high quality.



Every six months, external experts will be invited to evaluate the performance of
the project. Furthermore, it is important that they give recommendations on how
to correct any irregularities.



Trained groups should create entities to evaluate the performance of the Local
People’s Councils after the project ends.

6. INTERIM ASSESSMENT
NA
7. ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND
AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to the current situation in
Egypt. Therefore, throughout the past months, the main focus of the association has been
democratic transition in Egypt.

When planning for and organizing workshops and

trainings, the organization has brought prominent figures and experts on human rights
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and democracy to give sessions in Cairo and more marginalized groups in other
governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very organized and beneficial and attracted a
lot of civilians. The numbers of attendees started increasing one project after another due
to current misunderstandings people have due to biased media channels and newspapers.
One project that is proving to be very successful is “Preparing a new generation to
become human rights activists”. This project is intended to prepare the candidates who
volunteered in the project to rely on them in future projects. This project has been lately
covered by several news channels and online pages. It had also attracted several members
of the community, and are being very well trained by experts on human rights and
democracy. Another projects executed this year were the “New Labor Law draft” project
and the “Constitutional awareness” project.
Other funding:
None
References:
Mr. Hafez Abu Seada (Director of Egyptian Organization for Human Rights), Contact
info: 01222188309, E-mail: hafez@abuseada.com

Mr. Negad El Borai (Director of United Group), Contact info: 01222129637, E-mail:
negad@ug-law.com
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1. Applicant Information
Organization’s name: Arab House Foundation for Human Rights
Organization Acronym: AHFHR
Type of Applicant: NGO
First time or prior applicant: First time
Head
Prefix: Mr.
Name: Ehab Rady
Title: Chairman of the board of trustees
Phone: 01224001969
E-mail: Ehap_rady@yahoo.com
Website: https://www.facebook.com/#!/ArabHouseFoundationForHumanRights
Address of the organization: 4 Ahmed Maher Buildings, Bab El-Khalk,
Downtown. Ciaro
Key contact
Name: Rana Gawish
Title: Project Coordinator
Phone: 01011000610
E-mail: ranagawish@hotmail.com
Address: 2 El Obour Buildings, Salah Salem st., Heliopolis. Cairo
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Prior Experience of the organization:

AHFHR has started an array of projects and activities related to the current situation in
Egypt. Therefore, throughout the past months, the main focus of the association has been
democratic transition in Egypt.

When planning for and organizing workshops and trainings, the organization has brought
prominent figures and experts on human rights and democracy to give sessions in Cairo
and more marginalized groups in other governorates in Egypt. Those sessions were very
organized and beneficial and attracted a lot of civilians. The numbers of attendees started
increasing one project after another due to current misunderstandings people have due to
biased media channels and newspapers.

One project that is proving to be very successful is “Preparing a new generation to
become human rights activists”. This project is intended to prepare the candidates who
volunteered in the project to rely on them in future projects. This project has been lately
covered by several news channels and online pages. It had also attracted several members
of the community, and are being very well trained by experts on human rights and
democracy. Another projects executed this year were the “New Labor Law draft” project
and the “Constitutional awareness” project.

Operational budget: 80,000$
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Prior experience with the UN:
The organization has no prior experience with the United Nations, but it is looking
forward to build relations with the UN in regards to achieving mutual goals by combining
our efforts.

Affiliation with other associations or organizations:
The Arab House Foundation for Human Rights is part of a congregation of 76 human
rights organizations in Egypt. Almost 40 of those associations- including AHFHR- have a
very strong bond due to their similar agendas and more importantly, their similar political
affiliation. AHFHR’s relationship with the rest of those organizations is a very good one.
They issue reports and cover news under one auspice

2. Project Information
Project title: Youth and Women Empowerment: The importance of local representation
Project location: Egypt, all governorates
Project Summary:
Decentralization is one of the reforms that states need to adopt to recover from oppressive
authoritarian regimes and move to a democratic governance regime. The road is not easy
and the milestones need to be met. This project arises out of a new constitutional
framework that prioritizes women and youth. Its main aim is to enhance their ultimate
participation in the political life. This two year project is taking place during the
transitional period that Egypt is going through. This period requires the investment of all
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range of societal factions, in particular the marginalized and incapable groups, to enhance
their political participation.

Egypt now is experiencing a transitional period from a highly centralized state to a
decentralized one. After the constitutional referendum, it is estimated that 50% of the
Local People’s Councils seats will be for women and youth. Accordingly, this project is
significant as it aims to empower the youth and women, particularly in marginalized
areas in governorates, to establish Local People’s Councils that fights corruption. This
will only be attained through active members who are well aware of their responsibilities
and duties. The project will achieve its objectives through studies, training, and
monitoring members during the local elections.

Requested grant amount: 250,000 $

Applicants own contribution (cash/in-kind):
Contribution will in-kind. It will be through planning and organizing, consultating, and
managing.

Main feature of the project: Civil society empowerment, including women.

Gender considerations:
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This project is very gender sensitive. One of the target groups of the project is women.
The project seeks to empower women and teach them the importance of their
participation.

Marginalized or vulnerable groups:

This project targets the most marginalized groups in the state. It seeks to empower the
most vulnerable groups in all 27 governorates and let them know their rights and how to
call for it. It puts them on the road to become active citizens.

3. Project Description

Problem:

Egyptian youth identified the root cause of all their problems through lacking their
political rights through today’s democratic governance systems prevailing in democratic
countries. The corrupt institutions and the elite dominating political life with no hope of
alternation of power caused Egypt’s economic and political problems. They also realized
that the corrupt government is incapable of delivering public services to its people and is
a root cause for the lack of equal opportunity.

Democratic transition in Egypt has faced several impediments which led people today to
lose their hope and belief in a democratic rule to occur. The new drafted constitution,
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however, provides a significant importance to localities through the Local People’s
councils. Those councils are the only way towards true representation. Citizens have a
chance where their voice could be heard, where their voice can actually matter. The most
important question is how can we ensure that those localities will neither be corrupt nor
insignificant? The proposed project, thus, creates a chance for those localities to make a
difference in people’s lives. Those localities will only function correctly if the citizens are
empowered. The project’s target group is the youth and women as they make up about
50% of the new law for localities. The organization seeks to target youth and women in
the most marginalized areas in the state. Those people are the key towards a true
representation in localities if they become aware of their rights and knew how to call for
it.

Objectives:


An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils.



Drafting a new law for local people’s councils.



Awareness program



Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women

Key activities:

Objective 1:


An assessment on citizens’ problems and their needs from the local councils.

Relevant Activities:
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o Surveys


Research team to put a plan and expert to analyze and create
recommendations



Workshop: to evaluate the results and how to use it (with the
attendance of the ministry and parliament representatives).

Objective 2:


Drafting a new law for local people’s councils

There is a problem in the law that has been continuing for years. Hence of the activities
of the project is lobbying for a new draft law that calls for decentralization, transparency,
accountability, fighting corruption, and supports the youth with consideration that the
new drafted constitution states that 50% of the seats in the localities is for youth and
women. In addition, the current law from 1979 has not changed up till today.
Relevant activities:
o Experts committee for preparing a draft of the new law for local people’s
councils which aims to issue a new project law that ensures achieving the
objectives.
o Community discussions to all range of all political streams and classes
(civil society, parties, sects) about the draft law.
o Interviews and meeting with decision makers, government, and minister
for local development.
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o Suggest a final draft to the law to give it to the government and decision
makers to pressure its issuing. Pressure can also be through the parliament
to enforce this new drafted law.
o After its acceptance,


Create awareness programs



Provide training for members of Local People’s Councils.



Provide training for target groups (women, youth, civil society,
youth members of parties) in 27 governorates through the seven
provinces. Ex: El delta province, canal cities province, South
Upper Egypt province.

Objective 3:


Awareness program

Relevant Activities:
o Production of media and art works through caricatures and promos in the
social media and television from 1 to 10 minutes maximum. This aims to
spread awareness and simplify the information and ease its delivery to all
range of society (vulnerable and illiterate in villages and distanced areas).


These works will be used in training programs and workshops, as
well as publishing them in the social media and television.

o Establish a newsletter that aims to illustrate the project‘s importance and
its outputs.


Communications tool with the target group to publish the
aforementioned arts works.
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o Create brochures to illustrate the project team and the objectives of this
project to be distributed on the target group and beneficiaries.
o Public meetings with the target group to spread awareness about the
importance of participation in the elections of the local councils.
Objective 4:


Providing trainings for marginalized youth and women

Relevant Activities:
Two types of trainings:
3. Training possible candidates to become: active, aware, skilled to
perform all tasks relevant to people’s needs.
4. Training sessions to team to spread awareness amongst people in
coordination with civil societies in the targeted areas.

Outputs:


Awareness: 30 public meetings in villages and marginalized areas in the
governorates targeting 2700 citizen.



Two types of trainings should lead to:
1) Possible candidates. Choose 15 from every governorate (27 governorates)
which means that the project targets 405 possible candidates to run in the
elections in the Local People’s Councils.
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2) Training the youth to spread awareness through public meetings in the
governorate (10 from every governorate) to ensure sustainability and can later
monitor the Local People’s Councils.

Results/outcomes:
1) Changing the law.
2) Awareness leading people towards more participation in elections.
3) Cadre of 405 qualified candidates to participate in Local People’s Councils.

Monitoring and evaluation:


The project will be monitored on regular basis by the project management team to
ensure that all activities are taking place as scheduled and with high quality.



Every six months, external expert will be invited to evaluate the performance of
the project. Furthermore, it is important that they give recommendations on how
to correct any irregularities.



Trained groups should create entities to evaluate the performance of the Local
People’s Councils after the project ends.

Innovation:


Drafting a new law



Awareness through arts and media to simplify information.



Youth monitoring to Local People’s Councils post the end of the project.
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Sustainability:


Use trained groups to create entities to ensure the sustainability and continuation
of the project.



Community welfare will be regarded as crucial to improve people’s living
standards because their better quality of life will be enhanced only through those
localities.

Why UNDEF:
UNDEF’s main concentrations are exactly what this project needs. Strengthening the
civil society, promotion of human rights, encouraging participation of all groups,
community development, youth and women empowerment, and media, are all elements
that the project borrows from the mission of UNDEF. Hence, there is no better institution
to fit such project for not only funding, but also evaluation and recommendations.

4. Partner Information
Proposed executing agency: Specify Local Office of Executing Agency:Name of contact person:PositionE-mail:Phone Number:Partner: National Council for Research and Consultancy.
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NCRC offers a unique portfolio of programs for senior public service policy makers and
managers, parliamentarians, media representatives and people from NGOs worldwide.
Their programs are designed to provide participants with insights into many facets of the
Egyptian evolving public administration agenda. They feature visits to central and local
government departments and agencies, related public sector organizations, parliament,
the media, NGOs and private sector bodies. They provide an ideal opportunity for the
exchange of information and ideas between public service representatives from around
the world with each other and with their counterparts in the Egypt.

Other donors or sponsors: -

5. Budget
Budget by activity
Activity description

Amount in US$

Workshops targeted at local youth and

60,000

women
Community discussions and public

15,000

meetings
Production of art and media works targeted

35,000

at empowering youth and women
Development of advocacy/outreach

25,000

materials
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(surveys, brochures, newsletter)
Training sessions targeted at local youth

90,000

and women in governorates around the
country
Total project cost 225,000
Monitoring and evaluation 25,000
Total requested grant amount 250,000

Budget by input
Activity description

Amount in US$

Salaries

40,000

(Professional project personnel (national
and international employees) and
consultants. Administrative personnel and
all other staff costs for general project
management.)
Travel

20,000

(Travel and per diem (meals and
accommodation) for project management
team.
Contractual Services

3,000

(Commercial services, translation,
providers, etc.)
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Workshops, meetings, seminars

110,000

(rental of premises, refreshments, banners,
public address systems, interpretation,
travel, hotels and meals, resources,
including human resources)
Study tours

0

(travel, hotels and meals, resources,
including human resources)
Project equipments

5,000

(IT equipment, project support equipment
e.g. TV, radio equipment, printer)
Outreach

38,000

(publications, pamphlet, brochures, print
material, websites)
Miscellaneous

3,000

(stationery, communications, postage,
courier plus fuel, insurance, maintenance
contracts, utilities)
Audit

3,000

(certification of reports on the use of funds
by an independent auditor/accountant)
Other

3,000

(Please Specify): Gender Advisor
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Total project cost 225,000
Monitoring and evaluation 25,000
Total requested grant amount 250,000
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